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Introduction
In the waning days of 1991, a national headline proclaimed: "The Soviet
Union, as We Long Knew It, Is Dead. What's Next?"' For the United
Nations, faced with the sudden disintegration of one of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council, that question raised novel issues of
international law and Charter interpretation. Ultimately, without public
debate or fanfare, the Russian Federation-the largest of the former
Soviet Republics-was permitted to take over the Soviet seat as the "con-
tinuation" of the Soviet Union, and the other former Republics were
invited to apply for their own U.N. membership.
2
Less than a year later, when four of the six republics that made up the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) declared their indepen-
dence and applied for membership in the United Nations, the rump Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) sought to follow in Russia's footsteps
and quietly inherit the Yugoslav seat at the U.N.3 Instead, the FRY's claim
to automatic membership encountered stiff resistance by not only the
Security Council, but also by the General Assembly,4 which ultimately
adopted a somewhat bizarre resolution barring the FRY from participating
in the General Assembly but permitting it to continue to operate a U.N.
mission, to circulate documents, and to participate in other U.N. bodies.5
Before the dust had even begun to settle on the contentious issue of
Yugoslav membership, a third U.N. member-State-Czechoslovakia-
announced that it too was splitting apart.6 In an effort to avoid contro-
versy within the United Nations, the two resulting States agreed that they
would each apply for U.N. membership as a new member of that organiza-
tion.7 At the same time, however, they sought to divide between them-
selves the seats that had been assigned to the former Czechoslovakia in a
variety of U.N. subsidiary organs and Specialized Agencies.8 The United
1. See Michael Dobbs, The Soviet Union, as We Long Knew It, Is Dead. What's Next?,
WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1991, at A27. See also Bush Hails Dissolution of Soviet Union, Offers
High Praisefor Former Leaders, WASH. PoST, Dec. 26, 1991, at A35; Fred Hiatt, Soviet Union
to End Dec. 31, Yeltsin Aide Says, WASH. PoST, Dec. 18, 1991, at Al; Michael Dobbs,
Reformed Out of ajob: Gorbachev Is Left RulingKingdom of Air, WASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1991,
at Al.
2. SeePaul Lewis, WestActs to Defer Issue of New U.N. Council Seats, N.Y. TiMs, Jan. 3,
1992, at A6;JohnJ. Goldman, 15 World Leaders Invited to Major U.N. Summit, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1992, at A8.
3. See U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 20 and 68, U.N. Doc. A/46/
927 (1992).
4. See infta notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
6. See Katarina Mathernovi, Federalism That Failed: Reflections on the Disintegration of
Czechoslovakia, 1 NEw EUROPE L. REv. 477 (1993) (describing the impending disintegra-
tion of Czechoslovakia).
7. Agreement on Membership in International Governmental Organizations
(between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, and the Minister for International
Relations of the Czech Republic), Dec. 12, 1992 [hereinafter Membership Agreement]
(unofficial translation) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
8. Id.
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Nations rejected this attempt, and instead required formal elections to fill
the vacancies.9
As Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs at the U.S. Department
of State when these three cases arose, the author of this Article was
involved in the legal analysis, policy formulation, negotiations, and com-
promises that shaped the results described above.' 0 From the contrary
ways that the United Nations handled these cases, one might conclude, as
one commentator long ago suggested, that the question of succession to
membership in the United Nations is less a question of law than one of
political judgment, and that in such matters legal principles and Charter
interpretation take a back seat to political and administrative conven-
ience." Yet, careful analysis of these cases indicates that such a conclu-
sion would mistakenly undervalue the important role played by legal
theory and precedent in the context of succession to membership in the
United Nations.
To provide a backdrop for this analysis, the Article begins with a dis-
cussion of the relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter and a detailed exam-
ination of the United Nations' first case of succession to membership,
which came about in 1947 when British India split into India and Paid-
stan.1 2 From the positions taken by the members of the Security Council
and General Assembly in that case, the Article distills the principles that
strongly influenced the results reached in the Russia, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia cases and which are likely to guide the organization's
response to questions of succession to membership in the future. In so
doing, the Article explores the broader question of the role of law versus
politics in the internal functioning of the United Nations.
I. Background
A. The U.N. Charter
Membership in the United Nations by new States is equivalent to affirma-
tion of their full personality as international entities and is essential to the
complete enjoyment of their newly acquired status in an increasingly inter-
dependent world. Until a new state attains U.N. membership, it is
excluded from participating in several hundred multilateral conventions
9. See Memorandum from Assad Kotaite, President of the Council of the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization, to the Representatives of the Council 2 (Jan. 28,
1993), ICAO Doc. Pres AK/339, E 1/1.16 (summarizing U.N. Legal Counsel's opinion)
(on file with the Comell International LawJournal).
10. To the extent possible, consistent with State Department rules of confidential-
ity, this Article will chronicle these behind-the-scenes maneuvers by the United States
and other members of the Security Council. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of State.
11. See L.C. Green, The Dissolution of States and Membership of the United Nations, in
LAW, JUSTICE AND EQurrY 152, 167 (RH. Code Holland & G. Schwarzenberger eds.,
1967).
12. See infra notes 21-58 and accompanying text.
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that provide networks of international co-operation in a variety of fields.13
Moreover, upon admission to the United Nations, a new State is entitled to
automatic membership in virtually every functional organization within
the U.N. system simply by informing the Secretariat that it accepts the
obligations of the constituent instruments of these organizations. 14 It is
small wonder, then, that the newly emerging states of the former Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia immediately applied for U.N.
membership upon declaring their independence.
Article 4(1) of the U.N. Charter sets out the criteria for eligibility for
new members. It reads: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the
present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations."' 5 Article 4(2), which sets out the
process for admission of new members, provides that they "will be elected
by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the
Security Council."' 6
13. Many of the multilateral conventions administered by the United Nations pro-
vide for membership only of members of the United Nations. SeeTatsuro Kunugi, State
Succession and Multilateral Treaty Relations in the Framework of International Organi-
zations 83 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University) (on file with the
Cornell International Law Journal).
14. See id. at 86 n.1.
15. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1. The International Court ofJustice has restated the
conditions for membership as follows: "To be admitted to membership in the United
Nations, an applicant must (1) be a State; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obliga-
tions of the Charter, (4) be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) be willing to do
so." Conditions of Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1948 I.CJ. 57, 62 (May
28) [hereinafter Conditions of Admission]. The International Court ofJustice held that
the five requisite conditions "constitute an exhaustive enumeration" of the qualifica-
tions for membership. Id. at 62.
To be a "State" in international law, and generally for purposes of new membership
in the United Nations, an entity must have "a defined territory and a permanent popu-
lation, which is under the control of its own government, and the capacity to engage in
formal relations with other States." D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 304-05
(1965). This traditional definition of a "State" was adopted in article 2 of the Monte-
video Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, promulgated in 1933. Id.
16. U.N. CHAlrR art. 4, para. 2. The specific procedures for application are as
follows: In accordance with rules 58-60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the
Security Council, a State desiring U.N. membership must submit its application to the
Secretary General, who places the application upon the Security Council's provisional
agenda. Unless the Council decides otherwise, the application is submitted to the Com-
mittee on the Admission of New Members, comprised of a representative of each Coun-
cil member, for its report. After considering the Committee's report, the Council votes
on whether to recommend the applicant for membership. Votes on admitting new
members are subject to the veto. See LELAD M. GOODIUcH ET AL., CHArTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 223 (3d ed. 1969). In evaluating the applicant, the Council may con-
sider "any factor which it is possible reasonably and in good faith to connect with the
conditions laid down" in article 4. Conditions ofAdmission, 1948 I.C.J. at 63. If the Coun-
cil recommends membership, it forwards its recommendation to the General Assembly.
Article 18(2) of the Charter requires that admission decisions be made by a two-thirds
majority of the General Assembly members present and voting. U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
para. 4.
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While the Charter provisions described above governed new member-
ship for the former republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czecho-
slovakia, the Soviet situation also raised difficult issues related to the
disposition of the Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council. Based on
its status as a major power at the conclusion of the Second World War, the
Soviet Union-along with the Republic of China, France, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America-was assigned permanent Security Council membership under
article 23 of the U.N. Charter.17 With permanent membership on the
Council comes the right to veto substantive decisions' 8 -a right that
would-be successors to the Soviet Union obviously desired dearly.
Surprisingly, the U.N. Charter contains no provision for succession to
membership. Nor are the traditional rules on treaty succession 19 control-
ling in the context of international organizations. 20 Instead, such ques-
tions are governed by principles and precedents that have developed over
time. In addition, even within the U.N. system, various organizations have
developed different approaches to membership succession.
B. Historical Precedent
The breakup of the Soviet Union is not the first time the United Nations
has witnessed the division of a member-State. Whenever a member-State
breaks apart, there are several possible ways the United Nations could
respond. First, drawing upon the traditional rules of treaty succession, it
could permit all of the resulting States to succeed to the former State's
membership, that is, to become automatically U.N. members. Second, it
could require that all of the resulting States apply for membership as new
members before they are allowed to participate in the United Nations.
Finally, it could allow one of the resulting States to continue the former
State's membership while requiring the others to apply for new member-
ship. For a variety of reasons detailed below, the U.N. has rejected the first
option and opts to follow either the second or third options depending on
the circumstances.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 23; Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, A UN
Dilemma: Who Gets the Soviet Seat on the Security Council?, CHRISTIAN ScIENcE MONITOR,
Oct. 4, 1991, at 19.
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 17, at 19. The
other ten members on the Council do not have the veto and are elected to serve a term
of two years. U.N. CHARTR art. 23, para. 2.
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 210 (1987); Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/31, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488, 1497 (1978) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. Article 17 of the Vienna Convention provides that a successor
State may establish its status as a party to any multilateral treaty to which its predecessor
State was party merely by notifying the treaty depository of the succession unless the
application of the treaty in respect of the newly independent State would be incompati-
ble with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions
for its operation.
20. See Edwin D. Williamson &John E. Osbom, A U.S. Perspective on Treaty Succuion
and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA.J. INT'L L.
261, 267 (1993).
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The United Nations first faced such a situation just two years after its
founding, on August 15, 1947, when Great Britain granted independence
to British India, an original member of the United Nations, and divided its
territory into the separate Dominions of India and Pakistan. 2 1 On that
day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan sent a cable to the United
Nations Secretary-General expressing the opinion that "both the Domin-
ions of India and Pakistan should become Members of the United
Nations, automatically, with effect from 15 August." 22 Because Pakistan
desired to participate in the upcoming session of the General Assembly
without delay, the cable indicated that if the Secretary-General were not
willing to accept Pakistan's claim to automatic membership, he should
construe the cable as a formal application for admission by Pakistan. 28
The Secretary-General promptly transmitted the cable as an applica-
tion for admission to the Security Council, which considered the question
on August 18, 1947. During the Security Council's debate, France sup-
ported Pakistan's argument for automatic membership, but most mem-
bers took the position that Pakistan should be formally admitted to
membership. 24 Consistent with the conclusions of a legal opinion drafted
ten days earlier in anticipation of this situation by Dr. Ivan Kemo, the
Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, there was no challenge to
India's continued membership. 25 The Polish delegate remarked, how-
21. See Oscar Schachter, The Development of International Law Through the Legal Opin-
ions of the United Nations Secretaria 1948 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L 91, 101.
22. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 186th mtg. at 2027, U.N. Doc. S/496, A/CN.4/149 (1947).
23. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 186th mtg. at 2027-28, U.N. Doc. S/496, A/CN.4/149
(1947). See also Green, supra note 11, at 160; KP. Misra, Succession of States: Pakistan's
Membership in the United Nations, 1965 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 281, 288.
24. See D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
LAw 186 (1967) [hereinafter STATE SuccEssIoN].
25. The text of the legal opinion is as follows:
The Indian Independence Act provides that on the fifteenth day of August,
1947, two Independent Dominions shall be set up in India to be known respec-
tively as India and Pakistan. Under this act, the new Dominion of India will
consist of all the territories of British India except certain designated territories
which will constitute Pakistan.
What is the effect of this development on membership and representation of
India in the United Nations?
From the legal standpoint, the Indian Independence Act may be analysed as
effecting two separate and distinct changes:
1. From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a
part of an existing state breaks off and becomes a new state. On this analysis,
there is no change in the international status of India; it continues as a state
with all treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, with all the rights and
obligations of membership in the United Nations. The territory which breaks
off, Pakistan, will be a new state; it will not have the treaty rights and obligations
of the old state, and it will not, of course, have membership in the United
Nations.
In international law, the situation is analogous to the separation of the Irish
Free State from Great Britain, and of Belgium from the Netherlands. In these
cases, the portion which separated was considered a new State; the remaining
portion continued as an existing state with all of the rights and duties which it
had before.
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ever, that "this precedent cannot be cited in the future as ajustification in
the event another State should split up into several States and all of those
should ask for automatic admission, thereby depriving the Security Coun-
cil of the privilege of making recommendations with regard to new Mem-
bers."26 Notwithstanding this statement, the India/Pakistan case became
the primary precedent against which the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugo-
slavia, and Czechoslovakia would be gauged nearly fifty years later.
When the Security Council transmitted the resolution to admit Paki-
stan to the General Assembly, it was referred to the First Committee,
where the representative of Argentina expressed the opinion that both
India and Pakistan were either members by inheritance or they both had
to be formally admitted.2 7 Although there was substantial support for
Argentina's position, it was agreed that Pakistan's participation should not
be delayed.28 Accordingly, the First Committee voted to recommend to
the General Assembly that it admit Pakistan while simultaneously referring
the legal question of succession to the Sixth (Legal) Committee.29 The
question addressed to the Sixth Committee was framed as follows: "What
are the legal rules to which, in the future, a State or States entering into
international life through the division of a Member State of the United
Nations should be subject?"30
In response to this question, the Sixth Committee adopted and trans-
mitted the following principles to the First Committee as general guidance
for future cases:
1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to
presume that a State which is a Member of the Organization of the United
Nations does not cease to be a Member simply because its Constitution or
its frontier have been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the
State as a legal personality recognized in the international order must be
shown before its rights and obligations can be considered thereby to have
ceased to exist.
2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory
and the populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed
part of a State Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of
the Charter claim the status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has
been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter.
2. Apart from the question of separation, the Independence Act has effected
a basic constitutional change in India. The existing State of India has become a
Dominion and, consequently, has a new status in the British Commonwealth of
Nations, independence in external affairs, and a new form of government. It is
clear, however, that this basic constitutional change does not affect the interna-
tional personality of India, or its status in the United Nations.
U.N. GAOR, International Law Comm., 15th Sess., at 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/149
(1962).
26. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 186th mtg. at 2055, U.N. Doc. S/496, A/GN.4/149 (1947).
27. STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 24, at 186.
28. Id.
29. Green, supra note 11, at 160.
30. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 2d Sess., 42d and 43d mtgs. at 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
149 (1947).
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3. Beyond that, each case must be judged according to its merits.5 1
In the context of the India/Pakistan case, the first of these principles
suggests that there is a presumption against treating a State's U.N. mem-
bership as extinguished despite the division or dismemberment of that
State. The second principle, analogous to the rule of primogeniture,3 2
suggests that no more than one State can claim to be the continuation of a
U.N. member-State that has undergone such changes; all other States
formed in the division or dismemberment must formally apply for new
membership. The third principle seeks to limit the importance of prece-
dent and to preserve the political flexibility of the United Nations in
responding to future membership questions.
Before describing how the India/Pakistan precedent and the princi-
ples propounded by the Sixth Committee influenced the disposition of
the Soviet, Yugoslav, and Czech seats in the United Nations, it is worth-
while first to examine the validity of the legal position taken by the Assis-
tant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Security Council, and the
General Assembly on the question of Pakistan's membership.33 As
described below, there are three troubling aspects of the case that under-
mine its value as precedent.
The primary problem with the U.N.'s handling of the India/Pakistan
case was that it treated Pakistan as having broken away from India rather
than treating both India and Pakistan as simultaneously emerging as
independent States from the United Kingdom. According to the records
of the Parliamentary debate on the partition of British India,3 4 the United
Kingdom intended to set up in British India two co-successor States as
stipulated in the Indian Independence Act of 1947.35 In this regard, Dr.
31. U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582-83, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947)
(letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First
Committee).
32. Under the common law rule of primogeniture prevailing in England until 1925,
a single issue (the oldest son, if living) inherited the land. JESSE Du, EMINIER &JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 366 (1981).
33. See, e.g., Misra, supra note 23, at 289; Green, supra note 11, at 159-62; J.E.S.
FAWCETr, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 224 (1963).
34. One member of the House of Commons (Brigadier Low) pointed out that some
members of Parliament were suspicious that "the use of the word 'India' in the Bill is a
proof that His Majesty's Government take the view that Pakistan has seceded from the
whole of India. I have always taken the view, which I believe is right, that there has been
no secession but that this is the result of an agreement which has been approved by His
Majesty's Government, and that the Government do not favour one State or the other
in partition of India;" he asked for "confirmation of his view." Prime Minister Attlee's
reply was unambiguous: "The names are not meant to make any difference between
them. They are two successor States. They are separate and both of them will be
Dominions in the full effect of the term." Misra, supra note 23, at 286 (Citing 440 PARL.
DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 41, 44 (1947)).
35. Id. Misra notes that based on the description of the territories in the Indian
Independence Act of 1947 (that the new Dominion of India would consist of all the
territories of British India except certain designated territories which would constitute
Pakistan), Dr. Kemo concluded that this was a case where a certain part of the territory
of an existing international entity had separated or broken away from the parent State.
Misra suggests the inference was unfounded because the Act did not discriminate
Vol. 28
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Kerno's analogy between the separation of Pakistan from India and the
Irish Free State from the United Kingdom and Belgium from the Nether-
lands3 6 is of doubtful historical accuracy. As one commentator noted, "all
these were cases of secession, separation, or defection rather than division,
partition or dismemberment."3 7 If the United Kingdom rather than Brit-
ish India is viewed as the predecessor State, there is no legal reason why
the two Dominions should not have been dealt with as co-successors, in
which case they should have either both been given automatic member-
ship or both been required to apply for membership.
Second, the devolution agreement between India and Pakistan, which
provided that membership in all international organizations would
devolve solely upon the Dominion of India,3 8 should have been dis-
counted by the United Nations for a variety of reasons. Due to the coer-
cive circumstances surrounding the negotiations in the Partition Council,
Pakistan had little choice but to accept the provision. 39 In addition, the
provision runs counter to the intention and contents of the Indian Inde-
pendence Act of 1947.40 Moreover, since the only parties to the devolu-
tion agreement were India and Pakistan, it could not have any automatic
effect on the United Nations without the consent and acceptance of the
members of that organization.4 1 Finally, Pakistan itself treated the agree-
ment as a nullity when it claimed to have the same right as India to mem-
bership in the United Nations.
42
between the two Dominions; the way the territories of the two Dominions had been
defined was simply considered the most convenient one by Parliament. Id.
36. See supra note 25.
37. Misra, supra note 23, at 288.
38. Indian Independence (International Agreements) Order, quoted in U.N. GAOR,
6th Comm., 2d Sess., Annex 6c, at 308-10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/161 (1947).
39. One commentator asserts that Pakistan only reluctantly agreed to the devolu-
tion agreement in the face of pressure from the British Foreign Office, which, notwith-
standing Prime Minister Attlee's clarification in the House of Commons had taken the
position that India's membership in the United Nations continued and Pakistan was to
be treated as a new State. See Misra, supra note 23, at 288. Misra opines that one of the
reasons for the Foreign Office's position was that it feared such a precedent might allow
a country to borrow money much in excess of its .needs then go through a formal parti-
tion and claim that neither part of the divided country was responsible for the debts
incurred. Id. at 288 n.28.
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. See Green, supra note 11, at 161.
42. Pakistan repeated its claim when it adhered to the U.N. Charter after being
admitted by the General Assembly. In its statement, Pakistan said:
In one sense, the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations is not the
admission of a new Member. Until 15 August of [1947], Pakistan and India
constituted one State. On 15th August they agreed to constitute themselves
into two separate sovereign States. One chose to continue to call itself by the
old name of India, which had applied to the whole of the country, and the
other elected to call itself by the name of Pakistan. Inasmuch as Pakistan had
been a part of India, it was, in effect, under the latter name, a signatory to the
Treaty of Versailles and an original Member of the League of Nations.... In
the same sense, Pakistan, as a part of India, participated in the San Francisco
Conference in 1945 and became a signatory to the United Nations Charter.
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A third problem is that the precedent was not initially applied uni-
formly throughout the U.N. system. The International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU),4- for example, consciously departed from the General
Assembly's approach to the question of Pakistan's membership. At the
International Telecommunications Conference on September 4, 1947, the
Argentine Delegation made the following Statement:
The fact we must face is this: a member of the International Telecommuni-
cations Union, British India, has been divided into two neighboring States
which today form part of the "Commonwealth" of British nations under
conditions of absolute legal equality. One of these dominions, India,
retains its old constitutional and political name; the other acquires a new
designation: Pakistan. But the two States, are, in reality, the legitimate suc-
cessors to the rights and commitments acquired by British India within the
International Telecommunication Union when it signed the Madrid Con-
vention. Therefore, it is not fitting to bring up the question of an "admis-
sion" . . . . On the contrary, what is fitting, purely and simply, is to
"recognize" that both these new States are equally the lawful successors of
the old Member of the Union which was called British India, and nothing
more.
44
Accordingly, Argentina proposed that the ITU "recognize" India and Paki-
stan as members "in their capacity as successors of the British India, with-
out subjecting them to any process of admission." 45 The chairman of the
conference observed that the opinion expressed by the Argentine delega-
tion had given rise to no objection, and that Pakistan should be consid-
ered admitted to the ITU.4 Pakistan participated in the balance of the
conference and signed the International Telecommunications Conven-
tion of Atlantic City in 1947.47
Moreover, in 1961, the United Nations appeared to depart without
reason from the precedent and the principles adopted by the Sixth Com-
mittee in handling the dissolution of the United Arab Republic.48 Just
three years after uniting with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic,
Therefore Pakistan is not a new Member of the United Nations, but a co-succes-
sor to a Member State which was one of the founders of the Organization.
U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 92d plen. mtg. at 311, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/149 (1947) (quoted in
STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 24, at 187).
43. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) facilitates international
cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all kinds
and provides technical assistance to developing countries in the field of communica-
tions. A plenipotentiary conference of the members of the ITU is convened every five
years. See NEw ZEALAND MINISTRY OF ExTER'AL RELATIONS AND TRADE, 1992 UNITED
NATIONS HANDBOOK 214-15 (1992).
44. Documents of the International Telecommunications Conference at Atlantic
City (1947) 216-17 (1948) (on file with the Crnell In! rnational Law Jurnab)"
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Telecommunication Convention, T.IAS. No. 1901.
48. See FAWCET, supra note 33, at 224-25; STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 24, at 198
("Rousseau describes the United Nations practice as a 'flagrant contradiction' of the
principles concerning identity and succession of States") (quoting Charles E. Rousseau,
Chronique des Faits Internationaux, 66 RrvuE GtirALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
371, 413 (1962)).
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Syria broke away from the nascent Union by revolution on September 28,
1961, and claimed its independence under a new name-the Syrian Arab
Republic. 49 A week after achieving independence, Syria sent the following
note to the President of the General Assembly:
It may be recalled that the Syrian Republic was an original member of the
United Nations under Article Three of the Charter and continued its mem-
bership in the form of joint association with Egypt under the name of
United Arab Republic. In resuming her formal status as an independent
State the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has the honour to
request that the United Nations take note of the resumed membership in
the United Nations of the Syrian Arab Republic.5
0
Syria's request appears to contravene the India/Pakistan precedent and
the Sixth Committee's second principle, which states that
when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and the popula-
tion which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State
Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter
claim the status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has been for-
mally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.
5 1
The situation of a State, which has surrendered its independence and its
U.N. seat to join a Union and then breaks away from that Union and
asserts its independence, is little different than that of a territory like Paki-
stan becoming independent as an entirely new State by secession.
52
The President of the General Assembly consulted a number of delega-
tions and announced that "the consensus seemed to be that, in view of the
special circumstances of this matter, Syria, an original member of the
United Nations, may be authorized to be represented in the General
Assembly as it has specifically requested."5 3 No objection was made and
Syria resumed its U.N. membership without having to go through the
application process. Egypt, for its part, continued its membership in the
U.N. under the name UAR until it notified the Secretary-General on Sep-
tember 2, 1971, that it had changed its name to the Arab Republic of
Egypt.54 The Syria/UAR case can perhaps be distinguised from the
49. Green, supra note 11, at 164. Previous to its merger with Egypt, the name of the
State had been just "Syria."
50. U.N. GAOR, International Law Comm., 15th Sess., at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/4914,A/CN.4/149.
51. U.N. GAOR, 1st Comm., Annex 14g, at 582, 583, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947)
(letter from Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the Chairman of the First
Committee).
52. See Green, supra note 11, at 165.
53. Id. In the International Law Commission, the Syrian expert representing the
UAR was replaced by the Egyptian expert who had earlier resigned from the Commis-
sion when the UAR was formed. It is worth noting that, even though no more than one
expert from a State may be a member of the International Law Commission at one
time, the Commission members are elected as individual experts based on their recog-
nized competence in international law, not as representatives of a State which can be
freely substituted for one another. Id.
54. See U.N. GAOR, International Law Comm., 15th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/149
and Add. 1; United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1979 Sess.
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India/Pakistan case in that the old Syria had been an original member of
the United Nations, and the new Syria was, in effect, reasserting a tempo-
rarily suspended personality, the emphasis being on continuity rather than
disruption.55
The U.N. decision to follow the third of the possible options listed
above for dealing with succession to the British India seat was likely moti-
vated by practical concerns. If Pakistan had been treated as the co-succes-
sor to the British India seat, the United Nations would have had to accept
an automatic increase in the number of its original members. This would
not, however, have been the case with Syria's secession from the UAR,
since Syria had been one of the original members in its own right. As the
above quoted statement by the Polish delegate to the Security Council
indicates, 56 the members of the Council jealously guarded their right to
approve new members. This was particularly true during the early years of
the United Nations, when membership was not viewed as "universal" and
admission decisions were often held hostage to Cold War politics. 57 Tech-
nical organizations like the ITU, on the other hand, were less encumbered
by such political strife. Moreover, given the Soviet Union's demand when
the United Nations was founded to include all fifteen of its republics as
original members of the United Nations,58 there may have been legitimate
concerns that member-States might attempt to reconfigure themselves
into smaller units in an effort to increase their voting strength in the Gen-
eral Assembly. Finally, if India had been required to apply for member-
ship as was Pakistan, this would have meant the disappearance of an
and Resumed Sess. 1978, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/16/Add.2 (Official Records of
the United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Official
Records Volume III).
55. See STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 24, at 197. One commentator describes Syria
as having been in a three-year "state of suspended animation." Green, supra note 11, at
166. See also MARJORIE M. WHrrTEMAN, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 204-05 (1968);
Richard Young, The State of Syria: Old or New?, 56 AM.J. INT'L L. 482 (1962). If Yemen,
which was created when two U.N. member-States (North Yemen and South Yemen)
united in 1990, were to break apart as appears increasingly likely, the two resulting
States should be able to assert the UAR precedent for the proposition that both should
be permitted to resume their previous membership in the United Nations. See Margue-
rite Michaels, Splitting at the Seam: A Two-Man Rivalry Escalates into War, Threatening the
Four-Year-Old Union Between the North and South, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 43 (discussing the
current situation in Yemen).
56. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
57. Despite a large number of pending applications, only nine States were admitted
to the United Nations from 1945 to 1951, and from 1951 through 1954, no States were
admitted. The deadlock in admissions was finally broken and sixteen new members
were admitted in 1955. By 1966, 34 additional States had become members. FAwcgrr,
supra note 33, at 225.
58. The Soviet Union initially insisted that each of its fifteen republics be made a
separate member of the United Nations. When the United States countered by propos-
ing that each of the then forty-eight U.S. States should become separate members, the
Soviet Union reduced its demand to membership for the U.S.S.R. and just two of its
republics, Ukraine and Byelorussia. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HIsToRY OF THE UNITED
NArIONS CHARTER 361, 434, 535, 539, 597-98 (1958).
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original member at a time when, due to East-West tensions, there was no
guarantee that new membership for India would be swiftly forthcoming.
C. Legal Doctrine
While it may have been motivated by political factors, the U.N. decision on
the issue of India's membership can also be justified on legal grounds. It
is said that membership in an international organization like the United
Nations creates "a multiplicity of obligations, all of which are strictly per-
sonal in character," and therefore "the contractual relationship of the
member to the organization is dependent on the former's continued per-
sonality."5 9 Under this "continuity theory," membership may still pass to
States that have lost extensive portions of their territories and/or have
undergone radical changes in government as long as they are considered
to have inherited the essential "legal identity" of the former member.60 In
this regard, a distinction must be made between the concepts of "con-
tinuity" and "state succession." In the former, the same State is deemed to
continue to exist, while in the latter, one or more successor States are
deemed to have replaced the former State.6 1
Under the continuity theory, there can be only two ways to view the
division of a U.N. member-State: (1) as a "breakaway," in which one of the
divisions represents the continuing existence of the State while the others
represent States that have seceded from it; or (2) as a complete "dissolu-
tion," in which the State has been dissolved and none of the resulting
States represent its continuity. Thus, the determination of whether the
changes in a State constitute an extinction of its legal personality is critical
to the disposition of its U.N. membership. The legal identity of a State
might be destroyed if, for example, through division, it lost certain essen-
tial portions of its territory such as its seat of government, its original terri-
torial nucleus, or areas from which it obtained extensive revenues
necessary for the carrying out of its obligations of membership in interna-
tional organizations. 6 2 Moreover, the case for continuity might vary from
organization to organization depending on the nature and functions of
the organization and the obligations of its members.
63
While most commentators accept the continuity-succession dichot-
59. D.P. O'CoNNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 65 (1956).
60. See Schachter, supra note 21, at 105.
61. See JAMEs CRAWFORt, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 400
(1979).
62. See Schachter, supra note 21, at 105.
63. For example, some organizations may be related to a particular commodity that
is not produced in sufficient quantities in the "continuing" portion of the former mem-
ber-State to justify continuing membership. Such organizations may include the Inter-
national Jute Organization, the International Lead and Zinc Study Group, the
International Natural Rubber Organization, the International Office of the Vine and
Wine, the International Rubber Study Group, the International Sugar Organization,
and the International Wheat Council. The continuation approach might also be
incompatible with membership in organizations, such as INTELSAT and the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development, whose membership is associated with finan-
cial rights and assets.
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omy,64 there is little practical basis for the distinction with respect to mem-
bership in the United Nations. The distinction is said to be justified
because "membership of any international organization has as its essence
a willingness to co-operate in the furtherance of schemes of international
solidarity. Such a willingness cannot be assumed on the part of a new
State whose territory falls within the ambit of these schemes."65 This
rationale for not allowing a successor State to inherit its predecessor's
U.N. membership, however, would seem to be equally applicable to situa-
tions in which a continuing State has undergone a radical change of gov-
ernment. The schemes of the organization may well be just as inimical to
a new government as to a new State. Yet, unlike a new State, a continuing
State in which a democratic government is replaced by a totalitarian or
communist regime retains its U.N. membership under the continuity the-
ory. Furthermore, there is little practical difference between the obliga-
tion of a U.N. member-State and the obligation of a non-member-State to
comply with the binding decisions of the Security Council-sanctions can
be imposed on either for non-compliance. 66 Therefore, willingness to co-
operate in furthering U.N. schemes would not provide a legitimate basis
for treating successor States differently than continuing States. Indeed,
the rationale for the distinction actually turns logic on its head, since it is
not a question of the United Nations imposing obligations on the succes-
sor State; rather, it is the successor State which desires to inherit its prede-
cessor's U.N. membership with all the attendant obligations.6 7 Yet,
despite the dubious origins of the India/Pakistan precedent and the ques-
tionable nature of the legal doctrine supporting it, there is no doubt it
greatly influenced the U.N.'s response to the breakups of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
64. See, e.g., STATE SUCCESSION, supra note 24, at 183 ("Generally speaking, rights
and obligations of voting, with specific quotas of votes, and obligations of contributing
to the organizations' expenses, with fixed quotas of contributions, make it impossible to
accept a successor State as a successor in membership."); FA. Vallat, Some Aspects of the
Law of State Succession, 41 TRANSACnONS OF THE GROTUS Soc'y 123, 134 (1956) ("We
can say with some confidence that the new State does not inherit a right of membership
in international organization .... [M]embership depends upon the continuing person-
ality of the pre-existing State."); C. WilfredJenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-making
Treaties, 1952 Brr. Y.B. INT'L L 105, 133-34
(membership in international organizations and the obligations incidental
thereto do not pass to a successor State.... The membership of an interna-
tional organization has a personal quality and it is both reasonable and psycho-
logically sound and wise that a new member of the international community
should be required to apply for membership, particularly in the case of the
general international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.).
65. O'CoNNau.., supra note 59, at 65.
66. See U.N. CHAR=TR art. 2, para. 6.
67. The only situation in the U.N. context which mightjustify a continuity theory is
with respect to permanent membership in the Security Council, if one assumes the
number of permanent members cannot be increased or decreased without amending
the U.N. Charter.
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II. When Russia Came Knocking: Succession to the Soviet Seat
A. History: The Empire Crumbles
During the seventy years since its birth in 1917, the Soviet state, comprised
of fifteen republics in a federal union, gradually expanded to occupy one-
sixth of the earth's land surface.6 8 By 1991, its population had swelled to
over 290 million,69 its armed forces numbered over 3.7 million members,
it possessed some 27,000 nuclear weapons, 70 its gross national product was
over $2.5 trillion, and it had concluded over 15,000 international agree-
ments.7 1 The precise moment of this superpower's collapse may be sub-
ject to debate, but there is little doubt that the failed coup by hard-line
Communists on August 19-21, 1991 provided the fatal blow to the central
government's struggle to maintain its eroding power.72
Following the attempted coup, the central government immediately
allowed the former republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to secede
from the Union, while Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev labored unsuc-
cessfully for three months to convince other independence-minded repub-
lics to remain in some form of modified union.73 Gorbachev's proposed
"Union of Sovereign States" envisaged a hybrid half-federation, half-con-
federation in which the Union would act in international relations in the
capacity of a sovereign State and an entity in international law, while each
republic party to the Union would also be a sovereign State and a full
member of the international community.74 Consequently, the "center"
68. See David Hoffman, 'Soviet Union as We've Known It' Is Gone, Baker Says, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 9, 1991, at A16; THE WoRLD ALMANAC AND BOOK oF FAcrs 1991, at 760
(1991) (reporting that the Soviet Union was the largest country in the world, almost
three times the size of the United States).
69. James Rupert, Ex-Soviet Republics Sign Charter, WASH. PosT, Dec. 22, 1991, at A41.
70. Michael Dobbs, Shifting of Power Speeds Up in Moscow, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1991,
at Al.
71. Michael Dobbs, Yeltsin Asserts Full Control Over Kremlin, WASH. Posr, Dec. 20,
1991, at Al, A36; see also THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1991 760 (1991).
72. See Michael Dobbs, The Soviet Union, as We Long Knew It, Is Dead. What's Next .,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 4, 1991, at A27. Some date the beginning of the Soviet empire's
collapse with the death ofJoseph Stalin in March of 1953. Ironically (but not uninten-
tionally), the August coup came on the very day the republics were slated to sign
Gorbachev's new Union Treaty, which might have breathed new life into the decaying
Union. See, e.g., Melor Sturua, The Real Coup, FoRIGN POL'Y, Winter 1991-92, at 63.
73. The central government formally recognized the independence of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania on September 6, 1991, and the United Nations admitted them as
sovereign States two weeks later, on September 17. The dates (in 1991) on which the
other republics declared their independence are as follows: Georgia (April 9), Ukraine
(August 24), Byelorussia (now Belarus) (August 25), Moldavia (now Moldova) (August
27), Azerbaijan (August 80), Uzbekistan (August 31), Kirghizia (now Kirgistan) (August
31), Tajikistan (September 9), Armenia (September 23), and Turkmenistan (October
27). Kazakhstan and Russia never declared independence, but Russia did declare its
laws to be sovereign. Ralph Gaillard, Jr., Steps Toward Independencefrom the Former Soviet
Union, WASH. PoST, Dec. 3, 1991, at A14.
74. See Union Treaty: 23 July "Agreed" Text (unpublished draft, on file with the
Cornell International LawJournal). See also 'A Historic Chance... to Speed up Reform, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 3, 1991, at A16 (containing excerpts of a joint statement by President
Mikhail Gorbachev and leaders of 10 of the 15 republics outlining proposals for a
reformed Union). By November, the revised proposed Union Treaty would have left
Cornell International Law Journal
would retain the Soviet seat at the United Nations and would "support
applications of the union republics to the United Nations to recognize
them as subjects of international law."75
Notwithstanding apparent progress in Gorbachev's efforts to preserve
the Union, on December 1, 1991, ninety percent of Ukranian voters voted
for independence. 76 The surprising outcome of the Ukrainian vote per-
suaded the other republics that Gorbachev's attempts to negotiate a new
Union treaty were doomed.77 Summing up the resulting situation, then
C.IA. Director Robert M. Gates stated that "the center is evaporating
before our eyes."7 8 A week after the Ukrainian vote, the leaders of Russia,
Ukraine, and Byelorussia formally announced the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and said they had agreed to establish a "Commonwealth of
Independent States" in its place. 79 Shortly after this announcement,
eleven of the twelve remaining former republics signed a Commonwealth
Accord.8 0
the central government with the role of coordinating foreign affairs, economic matters,
and nuclear arms policy, with all other powers turned over to the republics. See Mar-
garet Shapiro, 7 Republics Balk at Union Pac4 WASH. Posr, Nov. 26, 1991, at A17.
75. 'A Historic Chance ... to Speed Up Reform', supra note 74, at A16. Gorbachev's
proposal would have in effect given the Soviet Union double representation in the
United Nations, since both the "center" and its constituent parts could not simultane-
ously be States. If the republics had retained the attributes of statehood, the center
would have qualified as an international organization but not as a State. Gorbachev's
plan may have been inspired by a proposal then under consideration by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), one of the bodies within the U.N. system, to accept
the European Community (EC) (now European Union) as a full member of the United
Nations while at the same time allowing the EC's constituent States to continue to
retain their individual memberships. See European Community Press Release (Nov. 26,
1991) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
The FAO arrangement is, however, distinguishable from Gorbachev's proposal in
that the FAO accepted EC membership on the understanding that the EC could only
exercise membership rights in areas within its competence and only when its member-
States would not exercise their rights. See United Nations Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, Report of Plenary Conference, U.N. FAO, 26th Sess., Agenda Item 24, para 9, U.N.
Doc. C.91/Rep/1 (1991).
76. Michael Dobbs, Slavic Republics Declare Soviet Union Liquidated, WASH. PosT, Dec.
9, 1991, at Al, A16.
77. Id.
78. George Lardner, Jr., CL_ Director Warns of Civil Disorder This Winter in Soviet
Union, WASH. Posr, Dec. 11, 1991, at A31.
79. Dobbs, supra note 76, at Al. The three republics claimed the right to dissolve
the Soviet Union as co-signatories of the 1922 treaty that established it. See Accord on
Creation of Commonwealth, WASH. Posr, Dec. 10, 1991, at A32. Gorbachev immediately
responded that the three republics did not have authority to dissolve the Union, which
still consisted of nine other republics. Margaret Shapiro, Gorbachev Rejects Common-
wealth: Declaration by Slavic Republics Is Called 'Illegitimate, Dangerous', WASH. POST, Dec.
10, 1991, at Al.
80. Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 23, 1991, atA10 [hereinafter Commonwealth Accords], reprinted in U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Annex V, U.N. Doc. A/47/60, S/23329 (1991), and in 31 I.L.M. 148 (1992).
Georgia did not sign the pact but sent a delegation of observers to the Alma-Ata meet-
ing. James Rupert, Ex-Soviet Republics Sign Charter. Yeltsin to Control Most Nuclear Arms,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al, A41.
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The Commonwealth Accord contemplates a conference of heads of
state and government based in the Byelorussian capital of Minsk as the
main political institution of the Commonwealth, with the chairmanship
rotating among the member-States. 8 1 Although the Commonwealth
would coordinate foreign affairs, defense, economics, and transportation,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin made clear that, in contrast to the
approach embodied in the Union Treaty proposed by Gorbachev, "the
Commonwealth is not a State."8 2 With respect to the Soviet seat in the
United Nations, in a display of George Orwell's maxim that "all animals
are equal, but some animals are more equal than others,"8 3 the Common-
wealth leaders underscored the pre-eminence of Russia in the new group-
ing by voting unanimously for Russia to assume the seat.8 4 Under the
Commonwealth Accord, the other members of the Commonwealth
(except Byelorussia and Ukraine, which were already U.N. members)
would insist on their rights as independent States to apply for their own
membership in the United Nations.85
A sweeping series of decrees by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and
action by the Russian parliament followed, transferring to Russia many of
the central government's agencies and institutions, including the Soviet
parliament, the Soviet Central Bank, the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and all
81. Rupert, supra note 80, at Al, A41.
82. Id. As of the time of this writing, the shape of the Commonwealth is still being
decided. Differing visions of the new arrangement in areas ranging from foreign policy
to national currency, and from economic coordination to national defense, have not
yet been reconciled. Ukraine, for example, has said it will issue a separate currency and
assert command over conventional forces stationed in the republic (about one-fourth
of the former Soviet army). Additionally, when the Ukrainian legislature ratified its
participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, it changed language in the
founding pact to accept only "consultation" in foreign policy rather than "coordina-
tion." Chrystia Freeland, Ukraine's Leader Takes Command of Soviet Forces in Region, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 13, 1991, at A41; Rupert, supra note 80.
83. GEORGE ORwELL, ANiMAL FARM 87 (1945).
84. See Commonwealth Accords, supra note 80, at A10. The Alma-Ata text contained
the following provision on U.N. membership:
PROCEEDING from the intention of each of the states to fulfill its duties stipu-
lated by the U.N. Charter and to take part in the work of that organization as
equal members;
TAMNG into account that previously the Republic of Byelorussia, the U.S.S.R.
and Ukraine were members of the United Nations organization;
ExPREssING satisfaction that the Republic of Byelorussia and Ukraine con-
tinue to be U.N. members as sovereign independent States;
BEING full of resolve to promote the consolidation of world peace and secur-
ity on the basis of the U.N. Charter in the interests of their nations and the
whole of the world community;
HAVE DECIDED:
1. Member states of the commonwealth support Russia in taking over the
U.S.S.R. membership in the U.N., including permanent membership in the
Security Council and other international organizations.
2. The Republic of Byelorussia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine will help
other member States of the commonwealth settle problems connected with
their full membership in the U.N. and other international organizations.
Id.
85. See Rupert, supra note 80, at Al.
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Soviet embassies abroad.8 6 As one commentator noted, "Yeltsin's decree
assuming direct control over the Kremlin, a walled city of palaces and
cathedrals adjoining Red Square, is the equivalent of a takeover of the
White House and Capitol Hill rolled into one."8 7 In the end, President
Gorbachev, left ruling nothing but "a kingdom of air,"8 8 agreed to step
down and end the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991.89
B. Russia Assumes the Soviet Seat
Russia's quest to inherit the U.S.S.R.'s U.N. seat took some U.S. officials by
surprise. Yeltsin's suggestion to Secretary of State James Baker during
their meeting in Moscow on December 16, 1991, that Russia would seek
the Soviet seat drew a noncommittal response. Baker said only that the
question would have to be taken to the United Nations, at which point the
United States would offer a view. 90 As late as December 22, U.S. officials
were still publicly stating that for Russia to replace the Soviet Union on the
Security Council, it must "first apply for the seat, after which the matter
would be debated by the General Assembly and Security Council."9 1
Meanwhile, Russian President Yeltsin sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-
General suggesting a far less cumbersome process. His letter proposed
that Russia would simply "continue" the membership of the Soviet Union
in the United Nations and requested that the United Nations use the
name "The Russian Federation" in place of the name "The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics."9 2
86. See Dobbs, supra note 71, at Al, A36.
87. Id.
88. Michael Dobbs, Reformed Out of a Job: Gorbachev is Left Ruling Kingdom of Air,
WAsH. PosT, Dec. 15, 1991, at Al.
89. See Fred Hiatt, Soviet Union to End Dec. 31, Yeltsin Aide Says, WASH. Posr, Dec. 18,
1991, at Al; David Hoffman, Yeltsin Declares New Commonwealth Will Take Control of Soviet
Military, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1991, at Al.
90. See Hoffman, supra note 89, at Al. Baker's response may be explained by the
fact that a few days earlier, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan reportedly
told him that Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics did not support Rus-
sia's automatic assumption of the Soviet seat at the United Nations. See Richard N.
Gardner & Toby Trister Gadi, Russia Deserves the Soviet Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at
A31.
91. Rupert, supra note 80, at Al.
92. The full text of the letter from President Yeltsin to the U.N. Secretary-General
follows:
I have the honour to inform you that the membership of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council, and
in all other organs and organizations of the United Nations system is contin-
ued, with the support of the States of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, by the Russian Federation (the RSFSR). In this connection, please, use
in the United Nations the name "The Russian Federation" in the place of the
name "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The Russian Federation remains responsible in full for all the rights and obli-
gations of the USSR under the UN Charter, including the financial obligations.
Please, accept this letter as constituting credentials to represent the Russian
Federation in the U.N. organs for all those currently possessing the credentials
of the representatives of the USSR to the UN.
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Finally, during a Christmas Eve televised speech to the American peo-
ple, President Bush announced that the United States would "support Rus-
sia's [automatic] assumption of the U.S.S.R.'s seat as a permanent
member of the United Nations' Security Council. '93 A week later, the for-
mer Soviet representative, sitting behind a shiny new nameplate embla-
zoned with the words "The Russian Federation," took part in the first
Security Council meeting of the new year without challenge.9 4 Within
twelve months, the United Nations approved the applications for member-
ship of the other former Soviet republics without dissent.95
C. Political Backdrop
In retrospect, given the swiftness and apparent ease with which the Soviet
seat was passed to Russia, this result might seem the only sensible solution.
During the period of transition, however, the United States and other
members of the Security Council seriously considered a variety of other
proposals. One option was to treat the Soviet seat as having expired. This
would have been consistent with the declaration made by the leaders of
the former Soviet republics in December that "the U.S.S.R. is ceasing its
existence as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality."96
Another proposal would have allowed the Commonwealth of Independent
States to take the Soviet U.N. seat.97 To understand the choice ultimately
made, one must begin by examining the motivations of the members of
the Security Council.
The question of the disposition of the Soviet Union's seat came
against a backdrop of efforts to seek amendment of the U.N. Charter to
provide for greater representation on the Security Council and to abolish
or modify the veto. As mentioned above, the U.N. Charter specifically
names the Soviet Union as one of the five permanent members of the
Security Council with veto power (the "Perm Five"). The other members
of the Perm Five worried that any change to the Soviet seat would set off a
Letter from Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, to Javier
Peres de Cuellar, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Dec. 24, 1991), U.N. Doc.
1991/RUSSIA (1991) [hereinafter Yeltsin U.N. Letter] (on file with the Cornell Interna-
tional Law JournO.
93. We Stand... Before a New World of Hope and Possibilits for Our Children, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 26, 1991, at A35 (speech of President George Bush).
94. Paul Lewis, West Acts to Defer Issue of New U.N. Council Seats, N.Y. TiMes, Jan. 3,
1992, at A6.
95. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, U.N. Doc. A/46/859 (1992)
(Admission of Armenia); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, U.N. Doc. A/46/860
(1992) (Admission of Kyrgystan); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20, U.N. Doc.
A/46/862 (1992) (Admission of Tajikstan); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 20,
U.N. Doc. A/46/861 (1992) (Admission of Uzbekistan).
96. Dobbs, supra note 76, at Al. Indeed, this would have been the likely outcome if
the Soviet U.N. seat did not come with the special privilege of permanent membership
in the Security Council.
97. See Peter Gumbel, Russia's Foreign Minister Seeks to Unite Republics on Key Issues,
WALL ST.J., Nov. 8, 1991, at All.
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scramble by other countries for Security Council reform.98
Since 1966, when the members of the United Nations amended the
U.N. Charter to enlarge the Security Council from eleven to fifteen mem-
bers, proposals have been made to make other States permanent members
of the Security Council (with or without the veto) in addition to or instead
of some of the Perm Five.99 In recognition of their role as economic
superpowers paying a rising share of U.N. bills, Japan and Germany have
been pressing for permanent Security Council seats,'0 0 and India, Brazil,
and Nigeria have been mentioned as possible candidates for permanent
membership without a veto.1 0 ' A proposal gaining increasing support
among many countries would merge the British and French permanent
seats and give this new single seat to the European Community, with the
leftover seat going to Japan.1O
2
The permanent members of the Security Council thus had an interest
in ensuring that changes to Soviet membership in the United Nations
would not produce challenges to other features of the Security Council,
such as the permanent five/rotating ten number and composition, the
inseparability of the veto from a permanent seat, and the non-rotation of
permanent members. Although amendments cannot be made to the U.N.
Charter without the consent of the permanent members of the Security
Council, 103 other members of the United Nations are free to propose such
changes and have ample opportunities to pressure the Security Council
and the General Assembly to adopt such proposals. As one commentator
noted, "The one thing the United States, Britain and France want to avoid
at all costs is anything that would open up the Pandora's box of a Charter
amendment altering the present membership of the Security Council and
possibly ending the right of veto."' 4
In particular, the permanent members reportedly feared that leaving
the Soviet seat vacant would be seen as an open invitation to other mem-
bers to push their proposals for expanding or altering the composition of
the Perm Five.' 0 5 Similarly, they were said to have been worried that
allowing the Commonwealth of Independent States to replace the Soviet
Union would further fuel proposals to replace Britain and France with the
European Community on the Council.' 0 6 According to press reports, they
98. See Lewis, supra note 94, at A6 ("The collapse of the Soviet Union was a logical
moment to reopen the United Nations founding Charter and review the Security Coun-
cil's composition, many nations contend."); see also Sam Jameson, Japan to Seek Seat on
U.N. Security Council, LA TimEs, Jan. 29, 1992, at A9.
99. SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 157 (1988).
100. Paul Lewis, 3 Western Powers Favor Russian Takeover of Soviet U.N. Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1991, at AS; Jameson, supra note 98, at A9.
101. Trevor Rowe, Switch of Soviet Security Council Seat Could Spur Reform Ideas, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 26, 1991, at A25.
102. Lewis, supra note 100, at A8.
103. U.N. CHARTER art 108.
104. Lewis, supra note 100, at A8 (quoting Richard N. Gardner, former U.S. Ambas-
sador to Italy, currently Professor of International Law at Columbia University).
105. Gardner & Gaff, supra note 90, at A31.
106. Rowe, supra note 101, at A25.
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were also concerned that giving the seat to the Commonwealth would
bestow permanent member status upon an entity with little real authority
which, because it must constantly seek consensus among the republics,
would at best produce delays in Security Council action and at worst para-
lyze the Council altogether on particular questions such as those relating
to Middle East issues.' 0 7
The permanent members therefore desired the disposition to be
undertaken smoothly without requiring or inviting Charter amendment
and in a manner that would not undermine the effectiveness of the Coun-
cil.10 8 In light of the precedent discussed in the next section of this arti-
cle, allowing Russia to take the seat in place of the Soviet Union seemed
the most orderly way to accomplish this goal.10 9
D. Fitting Within U.N. Precedent
During the month of December 1991, Russia's characterization of the
breakup of the Soviet Union underwent a radical change. At the begin-
ning of the month, Russia, along with the leaders of Ukraine and Byelorus-
sia, declared that the Soviet Union had "ceas[ed to exist] as a subject of
international law and a geopolitical reality."110 The Commonwealth
Accord signed later in the month by eleven of the former republics simi-
larly states that "with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist."l ' A letter
from Boris Yeltsin to President Bush stated, "the end of existence of the
USSR as a subject of international law require that.., the question of the
Security Council permanent member's seat be urgently addressed ....
Russia would be a State-successor to the USSR with respect to its seat in the
UN and the Security council [sic]."1112
In contrast, Yeltsin's December 26 letter to the Secretary-General
made no such references to the extinction of the Soviet Union and did
not use the term "State-successor." Rather, Yeltsin asserted that the Soviet
Union's U.N. membership "is continued" by the Russian Federation.' 13
The change in the way Yeltsin described the Soviet situation was not mere
happenstance. Instead, it clearly reflects the Russian leadership's growing
107. Lewis, supra note 100, at A8.
108. Rowe, supra note 101, at A25.
109. Id. U.N. membership issues were not considered in a vacuum. While the
United Nations can be deemed a "special case," treating Russia as the continuation of
the Soviet Union for U.N. purposes would suggest that treaty relations with the Soviet
Union continue for Russia but not for the other republics that have "broken away." If
the case were characterized as a dissolution, a stronger argument would exist that all
the republics continue to be bound by the former Soviet Union's treaty obligations,
including those regarding destruction of nuclear weapons and payment of official
Soviet debt.
110. See Dobbs, supra note 76, at Al.
111. See Commonwealth Accords, supra note 80, at A10.
112. Letter from Boris N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic, to George Bush, President of the United States of America (Dec. 20, 1991)
(on file with the Cornel International LawJournal).
113. Yeltsin U.N. Letter, supra note 92.
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understanding of the U.N. precedent regarding succession to member-
ship. To better reflect the legal strength of its claim to the Soviet seat,
Russia recast the Soviet situation in terms that would more closely follow
that precedent. To be consistent with that precedent, Russia would have
to argue that it would occupy the Soviet seat not as an entirely new State
succeeding to the rights of the Soviet Union (a "Successor State") after the
Soviet Union had ceased to exist, but as that part of the Soviet Union that
has survived the breakaway of the other republics. 1
14
In many ways, the India/Pakistan precedent and Russia's succession
to the Soviet seat present factually similar cases. India could easily be char-
acterized as the continuation of British India because it retained seventy-
five percent of the territory and eighty percent of the population of British
India, it kept the name India, and it kept the seat of the government and
virtually the same governmental machinery." 5 Moreover, on its face, the
devolution agreement between India and Pakistan seemed to clarify that
the two States regarded India as solely entitled to succeed to the British
India seat.' 16
Similarly, Russia-which had three-fourths of the former Soviet
Union's land area, more than half of the Soviet Union's population of 280
million, most of the Soviet Union's resources, nuclear weapons, nuclear
assembly plants, and its army, whose territory contained the seat of the
former Soviet Government, which had taken over most of the former
Soviet Government institutions and agencies, and which had obtained the
formal agreement of the other republics that it should take over the Soviet
seat in the United Nations'"17-could make a compelling case that it
should be treated as the continuation of the Soviet Union just as India was
treated as the continuation of British India. Moreover, Russia could argue
that, because two of the larger republics-Byelorussia and Ukraine"18 -
had been independent members of the United Nations since its inception,
the residual Soviet Union, for purposes of U.N. membership, has always
consisted overwhelmingly of Russia." 9 Even history could be used to bol-
ster Russia's position: when Czarist Russia became the Soviet Union after
114. The importance of Russia's characterization of itself as the continuity of the
U.S.S.R. cannot be overstated. When, in the case of a substantial change in the State
concerned, there are doubts as to the continued existence of the State, the position of
the State itself on the issue can be the determining factor. See Rein Mullerson, New
Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 299, 803 (1993).
115. See Kunugi, supra note 13, at 65.
116. See Section 2 of the Schedule to Indian Independence (International Arrange-
ments) Order, 1947, reprinted in part in Misra, supra note 23, at 283-84.
117. See Rupert, supra note 80, at A41; Dimitri Simes, Rusia Reborn, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Winter 1991-92, at 41, 42.
118. Ukraine, with an area about the size of Texas, is the second most populous
republic with 52 million people and accounted for about a quarter of the Soviet
Union's agricultural and industrial might. It has an army of 450,000 and produced
56% of the Soviet Union's corn and 25% of its wheat. In addition, it mined 47% of all
Soviet iron ore and 25% of its coal. Ralph Gaillard,Jr., Ukraine at a Glance WASH. Pour,
Dec. 3, 1991, at A14. Byelorussia is a heavily industrialized country of 10.2 million peo-
ple. See The New Slavic Commonwealth, WASH. PoSr, Dec. 9, 1991, at A16.
119. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 17, at 19.
Vol. 28
1995 Musical Chairs
the revolution of October 1917, the international community insisted that
the Soviet Union was not a new State, but simply a new regime.' 20
Obviously, the case would have been different if there had been no
dominant entity remaining which could be considered to possess the polit-
ical, economic, and military power of the entity to which it sought to suc-
ceed, especially with respect to a State that had permanent Security
Council membership. Indeed, despite Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander
Bessmertnykh's protestations that "Russia will remain a great power,"12 1 if
not for the political concerns described earlier, proposals may well have
been made to allow the Soviet Security Council seat simply to expire on
the ground that this special status was accorded the Soviet Union based
upon unique historical circumstances and its superpower status. After all,
a superpower is more than "a central Eurasian arsenal that used to be a
country."1 22
Assertions by the leaders of Russia and the other former republics
that the Soviet Union ceased to exist initially placed the logic and legal
basis of Russian succession to the Soviet seat in serious doubt.' 23 Clearly,
the India/Pakistan precedent turned on this point. As characterized by
120. The Soviet Union had insisted it was a new State and was therefore not responsi-
ble for the debts assumed by Czarist Russia. The international community universally
rejected this argument and continued to call on the Soviet Union to carry out the obli-
gations of the previous regime. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 208 reporter's note 2 (1987).
121. David Remnick, In New Commonwealth of Equals,' Russia Remains the Dominant
Force: Historical Status, Space-Age Arms Ensure Regional Primacy, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
1991, at A39.
122. Lardner, supra note 78, at A31 (quoting Robert Gates, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency). Russia's swift assumption of the Soviet Security Council seat may
turn out to be a mixed blessing, especially if, as some former Soviet officials have
warned, "The disintegration of the [Soviet] Union will be followed by the disintegration
of the Russian [Republic]." Fred Hiatt, Russia, Ukraine See Commonwealth Differently,
WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1991, at A40. Autonomous Russian republics like Siberia, and
autonomous territories such as Bashkortistan, Chechnya, Dagestan, and Tatarstan are
already agitating for secession. See Stephan Kux, Confederalism and Stability in the Com-
monwealth bfIndependent States, 1 NEw EuPL L. REv. 387, 395 (1993). Simultaneously,
Russia has begun to pursue aggressively the forcible reabsorption of several of the for-
mer Soviet republics. In particular, Russian troops have been active in supporting
secessionist movements in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. According to Paul Goble,
a former State Department specialist on ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R.,
[t]he key development of the last six months was the destruction of Georgian
independence by the Russian army .... The failure of the international com-
munity to say anything about this has been taken by the leaders of several other
republics as a sign that the world would be totally unprepared to help them,
regardless of what Moscow does.
Paul Quinn-Judge, US is Said to Favor a Russian Sphere: Backing of Role in Ex-Republics,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1994, at 1, 13. As a permanent member of the Security Coun-
cil, Russia is in a position to implement such a policy with impunity, since it can veto
any efforts by the Council to halt such action. For example, after the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, it vetoed a Security Council resolution that
would have condemned the invasion. See B.ARxt E. CARTER & PHiLUP R. TRIMBLE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 63 (1991).
123. See Commonwealth Accords, supranote 80; see also supra notes 111-12 and accompa-
nying text.
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the United Nations, while India's sovereignty had changed, at no time did
it become legally extinct as a State. By the same logic, the Russian letter to
the Secretary-General asserting that Russia was the continuation of the
Soviet Union fortified Russia's case. 124
The timing of Russia's effort to inherit the Soviet seat may have also
been important. Russia made its bid at a time when only the Security
Council was in session and when the next session of the General Assembly
was months away. Having participated in the Security Council for several
months without objection, Russia minimized the possibility that members
of the General Assembly would be able to challenge its assumption of the
Soviet seat. As one involved diplomat remarked, "Frankly, we were lucky
the General Assembly wasn't in session .... Otherwise we might have had
howls of fury to contend with."' 25
M. The Exclusion of the "New Yugoslavia"
A. The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Question of FRY Continuity
Prior to its fragmentation, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had
an overall population of 23.7 million people and the third largest army in
Europe.1 26 Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: Serbia (with a population
of 9.8 million people), Croatia (4.7 million), Bosnia-Herzegovina (4.1 mil-
lion), Macedonia (2.1 million), Slovenia (1.9 million), and Montenegro
(0.5 million).127 The death of the great Yugoslav leader Joseph Broz Tito
and the collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed the centrifugal forces
which led to the country's disintegration beginning inJune 1991.128 Over
the course of the next ten months, four of the six Yugoslav republics-
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina-declared their
independence and were formally recognized as sovereign States by the
international community.129 In response, Serbia sent the former Yugosla-
via National Army (JNA) into Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, setting off a
conflict which by 1993 had claimed over 200,000 lives.'5 0 Together with
local insurgent forces, the JNA quickly seized control of one-third of the
territory of Croatia and two-thirds of Bosnia.' 8 '
On April 27, 1992, a joint session of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the National Assembly
of the Republic of Serbia, and the Assembly of the Republic of Montene-
gro adopted a declaration expressing the will of the citizens of Serbia and
124. SeeYeltsin U.N. Letter, supra notes 92, 113 and accompanying text.
125. See Lewis, supra note 94, at A6.
126. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
127. Id.
128. See VIRGINIA MoRIus & MicHAEL ScHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FoRMER YUGOSLAVIA 18 (1995).
129. See Weller, supra note 126, at 586-98.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Montenegro to "stay in the common State of Yugoslavia .... 1 2 At the
time of this declaration, the U.N. Security Council was considering impos-
ing economic sanctions against Serbia for its involvement in the hostilities
in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia.133 In this context, the Security Council
was unlikely to approve an application by Serbia-Montenegro for new
membership in the United Nations. Consequently, it was critically impor-
tant to Serbia-Montenegro that it be viewed as the continuation of the
former Yugoslavia so that it could circumvent the application process.
Thus, the April 27 declaration proclaimed that the "Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) continu[es] the State, international legal and political
personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."' 13 4 To justify
the treatment of the FRY as the continuation of the former Yugoslavia,
Serb officials asserted that the FRY had "all the physical and material as
well as legal conditions for Yugoslavia's uninterrupted identity and exist-
ence."' 3 5 A comparison between the Yugoslavian situation and the Rus-
sian and Indian precedents provides a framework for assessing that claim.
Several factors support the FRYs claim to be the continuation of the
former Yugoslavia. First, the other formerYugoslav republics split off from
Yugoslavia at different times.' 3 6 Second, the FRY never claimed to be a
new State but rather maintained that it continued the legal personality of
the former Yugoslavia after the breakaway of the other republics. Third,
the FRY, like Russia, has the most land mass and largest population of all
the Yugoslav republics. Serbia and Montenegro's combined territory of
102,000 square kilometers comprises forty percent of the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, and its population of 10.3 million is forty-five percent
of that of the former Yugoslavia.1 3 7 Just as Russia formed the historic hub
of the Soviet Union, Serbia and Montenegro formed the historic nucleus
of Yugoslavia, including the federal capital of Belgrade. 138 The FRY
retained most of the former Yugoslavia's central government institutions
and control of a majority of the former Yugoslavia's federal armed
132. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (1992).
133. The Security Council ultimately adopted Resolution 757 on May 30, 1992,
imposing sweeping sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro). S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757
(1992).
134. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (1992).
135. Weller, supra note 126, at 595 (quoting Statement of VladislavJovanovi, Serbian
Ministerfor Foreign Affairs at the Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992 REv. INT'L AFF., No. IV, at
14, 15).
136. Croatia and Slovenia declared independence inJune 1991, Macedonia declared
independence in November 1991, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in
March 1992. THE WORLD ALMANAc AND BOOK OF FAcrs 1993, at 736, 815 (1992).
137. Yehuda Z. Blum, U.N. Membership of the Vw' Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break, 86
AM.J. INT'L L. 830, 833 (1992).
138. THE WoRLD ALmANAC AND BOOK OF FACrs 1993, at 815 (1992). Before the for-
mation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (which became Yugoslavia),
only Serbia and Montenegro existed as independent States. The other Yugoslavian
republics were former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian empire that never had
independent status. Id.
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forces.' 3 9
The Yugoslavia situation and the earlier precedents, however, proved
far from a perfect match. In contrast to Russia and India, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro together do not comprise a majority, let alone a substantial major-
ity, of Yugoslavia's land, population, or resources. 140 Moreover, unlike
Russia and India, no devolution agreement existed between the republics
of the former Yugoslavia providing that the FRY shall continue the former
Yugoslavia's membership in the United Nations. Indeed, the other former
republics were quick to assert that Yugoslavia had dissolved and that the
FRY should not be entitled to the former Yugoslavia's seat at the United
Nations.14 ' Finally, by undertaking and supporting aggressive actions in
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, the FRY provided the members of the
United Nations with a strong political reason to block the FRY's effort to
assume the Yugoslavia seat.142
B. The Initial Reaction of the International Community
The United States, Canada, Japan, and most of the members of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) boycotted the April 27 ceremony inaugurating the
FRY, and an EC spokesman declared that the disposition of the former
Yugoslavia's seat at the United Nations was a matter that all the former
members of the Yugoslav Federation had to decide together.' 43 Later that
week, when the FRY circulated a copy of the April 27 Declaration to the
members of the Security Council,'4 Australia, Canada, the EC, and the
United States responded by sending communications to the Presidents of
the Security Council and the General Assembly expressly reserving their
position as to whether the FRY should be treated as the continuation of
the former Yugoslavia for purposes of membership in the United
Nations.14 5 Austria went even farther in its communication, stating that
139. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SEss., THE
ETHNIc CLEAsnG OF BOsmiA-H RzEGOviNA app. 1 at 37 (Comm. Print 1992) (on file
with the Cornell International Law Journal).
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United
Nations (June 30, 1992)
(The Government of the Republic of Croatia considers that no state or other
entity can automatically succeed the rights and obligations of former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nor inherit it's [sic] membership in the United
Nations. It is therefore unacceptable that the so-called Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, consisting only of Serbia and Montenegro, assumes the seat of for-
mer Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations.)
(on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
142. According to Edwin Williamson, the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of
State at the time the issue of the FRY's membership in the United Nations first arose,
treating the FRY as the continuation of the former Yugoslavia would have been "politi-
cally unpalatable." Williamson & Osborn, supra note 20, at 270.
143. Tony Barber, West Cool on Serbia's 'New Yugoslavia, 'INDEPFNDENT, Apr. 28, 1992,
at 11; Dessa Trevison & Tim Judah, Nations Boycott Ceremony Marking Birth of a Third
Yugoslavia, THE TIMES, Apr. 28, 1992, at 9.
144. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/23877 (1992).
145. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 68, U.N. Doc. A/46/907 (1992) ("Austra-
lia wishes to place on record its view that the current participation of representatives of
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"there is no legal basis for an automatic continuation of the legal existence
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which therefore cannot be considered to continue
the Yugoslav membership in the United Nations."14
6
The issue next arose on May 22, 1992, when the Security Council and
General Assembly voted to admit three of the other former Yugoslav
republics as new members of the United Nations. The FRY circulated a
document in the General Assembly, which stated:
the fact that the Republic'of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia. and the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have become Member States of the
United Nations in no way challenges the international legal personality and
continuity of membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
United Nations and its specialized agencies.
147
The United States responded in a statement to the General Assembly that
"if Serbia and Montenegro desire to sit in the U.N., they should be
required to apply for membership and be held to the same standards as all
other applicants."'148 According to the then Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State, "the U.S. position was very simple in this regard:
because the SFRY no longer exists, and Serbia-Montenegro is not the con-
tinuation of, or the sole successor to, the former Yugoslavia, Serbia-Monte-
negro is not entitled to assume the seat of the former Yugoslavia in
international organizations."' 49
Despite these statements, no immediate action was taken to prevent
the FRY from participating in U.N. meetings. During the next several
months, the United States consulted with foreign ministries around the
world to enlist their support for the American strategy to oust the FRY
from the United Nations.150 There were several possible ways to accom-
plish the task consistent with the U.S. view that the FRYwas not the contin-
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in meetings of international organizations is without
prejudice to the eventual resolution of the question of the status of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia."); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 68, U.N. Doc. A/46/
905 (1992) ("The European Community and its member States have not accepted the
automatic continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in international organiza-
tions including the United Nations. At this stage, they reserve their position on this
question."); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 68, U.N. Doc. A/46/906 (1992) (sim-
ilar statement by the United States); U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 68, U.N. Doc.
A/46/909, S/23883 (1992) (similar statement by Canada).
146. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 69, U.N. Doc. A/47/201, S/23876
(1992).
147. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Items 20 and 68, U.N. Doc. A/46/927
(1992).
148. Statement of Ambassador Edward J. Perkins, United States Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, in the General Assembly, on the Admission of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (May 22, 1992), Press Release USUN 35-(92)
(May 22, 1992) (on file with the Comell International Law Journal).
149. Williamson & Osborn, supra note 20, at 272.
150. See FrankJ. Prial, U.S. Quietly at Work to Oust New Yugoslavia from the U.N., N.Y.
TiMEs, June 14, 1992, at 25.
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uation of the former Yugoslavia.' 5 ' One possibility was to mount a
credentials challenge, as against South Africa in 1974.152 Another option
was for the General Assembly to pass a resolution rejecting the FRY's claim
to be the continuation of the former Yugoslavia, much as the General
Assembly had unseated the delegation of the Nationalist Government as
the representative of China in the United Nations in 1971.153 A third
option was for the General Assembly to act upon the recommendation of
the Security Council, following the Charter's formula for other member-
ship questions by analogyT M
The permanent members of the Security Council found the last of
these options the most attractive because, by requiring the approval of the
Security Council as a prerequisite for General Assembly action, their abil-
ity unilaterally to block this type of action against other members in the
future was preserved. During the last week of May 1992, the United States
sought to implement its proposal as part of Resolution 757, which
imposed economic sanctions on the FRY. The other permanent members
of the Council, however, were not ready to take such action, and the lan-
guage ultimately adopted in the resolution merely noted that the FRY's
claim to the U.N. seat "has not been generally accepted.' 5 5
One month later, a decision by the Arbitration Commission of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia' 5 6 breathed new life
151. The Security Council and General Assembly could have acted to expel or sus-
pend the FRY under articles 5 and 6 of the U.N. Charter, but that would have meant
recognizing that the FRY was a member of the United Nations. Article 5 provides that
"[a] Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has
been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights
and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council." Article 6 similarly states that "[a] Member of the United Nations
which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be
expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council."
152. See Alden Abbott et al., The General Assembly, 29th Session: The Decredentialization
of South Africa, 16 HAuv. INT'L LJ. 576 (1975). The United States, France, and the
United Kingdom opposed the South Africa credentials challenge as a violation of the
U.N. Charter. Since the South Africa delegation's credentials were technically in order,
they argued that the credentials challenge was really a unilateral act by the General
Assembly to suspend a member-State in violation of the requirements of article 5 of the
U.N. Charter. See U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2281st mtg. at 76-81, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2281
(1974); U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2248th mtg. paras. 86-107, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2248
(1974).
153. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
98TH CONG., 1sr Sr.ss., CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY. THE PROCESS AND ITS ROLE 8 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CREDENTIALS
CONSIDERATIONS].
154. See U.N. CHARTER art. 4 (admission of members), art. 5 (suspension of mem-
bers), and art. 6 (expulsion of members).
155. John Goshko, U.N. Votes Curbs on Yugoslavia, WASH. POST, May 31, 1992, at A28.
156. The Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia was jointly created by the United
Nations and the EC. Under its auspices, an arbitration commission was established with
the consent of the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to rule on specific
questions relating to the secession of the formerYugoslav republics. SeeVladimir-Djuro
Degan, Conrpondents'Agora: U.N. Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
240 (1993).
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into the U.S. proposal. On July 4, 1992, the Commission issued three
opinions stating that the former Yugoslavia has been dissolved and that it
"no longer exists"; that the FRY "is a new State"; and that none of the
successor States, including the FRY, can claim sole entitlement to "the
membership rights previously enjoyed by the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia." 157 While the FRY responded that the Commission's opinions
went beyond the scope of the Arbitration Agreement and were therefore
"null and void and non-binding,"15 8 the EC decided that it would support
proposals to bar the FRY from participating as the continuation of the
former Yugoslavia in international bodies.' 59
C. Security Council Resolution 777 and General Assembly Resolution
47/1
With the EC finally on board and the opening session of the General
Assembly approaching, the United States felt the time was right to press
the issue in the Security Couqcil. The United States circulated a draft
resolution that would have
[r]ecommend[ed] to the General Assembly that it deny the claim by the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue auto-
matically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in the United Nations and that it confirm that Yugoslavia's
membership in the United Nations has been extinguished.' 60
In order to obtain Russian support, however, the resolution, as finally
adopted, was substantially weakened 16 1 to read:
Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,
Recalling in particular resolution 757 (1992) which notes that "the
claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally
accepted",
1. Considers that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and there-
fore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for member-
157. Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yugo-
slavia, Opinion Nos. 8, 9, and 10, reprinted in U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/48/874, S/1994/189 (1994).
158. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 3, U.N. S/1994/398 (1994).
159. See EC Declaration of 20 July 1992: Participation of Yugoslavia in International
Bodies (on file with the Comell International LawJournal).
160. Id. Annex 1 (reproducing U.S. draft resolution).
161. SeeAndrew Katell, U.N. Council rges Ouster of Yugoslavia, WASH. PoST, Sept. 24,
1992, at 1 ("The Resolution was watered down in private meetings over the past week
largely to satisfy Russian objections, diplomats said. Russia, which has the power to veto
resolutions, worried that.excluding Yugoslavia entirely from the United Nations would
isolate it and hinder peace talks.").
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ship in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of
the General Assembly,
2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the main
part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.
162
As adopted, Resolution 777 contains language that is ambiguous and
internally inconsistent. On the one hand, the resolution appears to reflect
the U.S. view that Yugoslavia has ceased to exist and that the FRY must
apply for membership in the United Nations. On the other, the only con-
sequence that the resolution draws is that the FRY shall not participate in
the work of the General Assembly. Normally, one would turn to the Secur-
ity Council's record of debate to illuminate an ambiguously worded text.
In this case, however, the statements made by the members of the Council
at the time of voting on the resolution were as inconsistent as the language
of the resolution itself.'
63
To enable the reader to appreciate these contradictions fully, the
statements of Russia and the United States are quoted at some length
below. Before voting on the resolution, Russia stated:
The delegation of the Russian Federation is ready to support the draft
resolution agreed upon by members of the Security Council in the course
of their consultations, on the basis of the fact that the prevailing view in the
international community is that none of the republics that have emerged in
the place of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can claim
automatic continued membership in the United Nations. We agree that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like other former Yugoslav republics, will
have to apply for membership in the United Nations, and we will support
such an application.
At the same time, we were unable to agree with the proposal, put for-
ward by some States, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be
excluded formally or de facto from membership in the United Nations ....
The compromise that has been reached-that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia should not participate in the work of.the General Assembly-
may seem unsatisfactory to some .... At the same time, the decision to
suspend the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the work
of the General Assembly will in no way affect the possibility of participation
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the work of other organs of the
United Nations, in particular the Security Council, nor will it affect the issu-
ance of documents to it, the functioning of the Permanent Mission of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations or the keeping of the
nameplate with the name Yugoslavia in the General Assembly Hall and the
rooms in which the Assembly's organs meet.'64
The United States, on the other hand, made the following statement:
For the first time, the United Nations is facing the dissolution of one of
its Members without agreement by the successor States on the status of the
original United Nations seat. Moreover, none of the former republics of
162. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777
(1992).
163. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg. at 1-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3116 (1992).
164. Id. at 2-4.
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the former Yugoslavia is so clearly a predominant portion of the original
State as to be entitled to be treated as the continuation of that State. For
these reasons, and in the absence of agreement among the former repub-
lics on this issue, my Government has made it clear all along that we cannot
accept Serbia and Montenegro's claim to the former Yugoslavia's United
Nations seat.
We are gratified that the current resolution endorses this view and rec-
ommends that the General Assembly take action to confirm that the mem-
bership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has expired and
because Serbia and Montenegro is not the continuation of the Socialist Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia it must apply for membership if it wishes to par-
ticipate in the United Nations.
I would like to comment on the provision of the resolution that Serbia
and Montenegro shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly.
This provision flows inevitably from the determination by the Council and
the General Assembly that Serbia and Montenegro is not the continuation
of the former Yugoslavia and must apply for membership in the United
Nations. To state the obvious, a country which is not a member of the
United Nations cannot participate in the work of the General Assembly.1
6 5
Russia thus maintained that the resolution merely "suspended" the
FRY from the work of the General Assembly and permitted the FRY to
continue to participate in all other respects as a member of the United
Nations. The United States, on the other hand, asserted that the action
confirmed that Yugoslavia's membership had "expired" and that the FRY
could not participate in the work of the General Assembly because it was
not a member of the United Nations. The United Kingdom attempted to
clarify the matter when it introduced General Assembly Resolution 47/
1,166 implementing the Security Council's recommendation:
The text before us does two things. First, the Assembly would decide
that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not
participate in the work of the General Assembly this means in particular
that no representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will sit in the
seat of Yugoslavia in any organ of the Assembly. Second, the Assembly
would decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) would apply for membership in the United Nations. In other words, as
regards the need to submit an application for membership, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is in precisely the same
position as other components of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia....
In no sense is this draft resolution a punitive measure, nor one
designed to undermine the peace process. Quite the contrary. It is a mea-
sure that we have been forced to take by the completely unjustified claim by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to represent
165. Id. at 12-13. France similarly stated, "In this respect, [the resolution] confirms
and translates into reality the international community's rejection of the automatic con-
tinuation in the United Nations of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Id. at 12.
166. GA Res. 47/1, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (1992). The
General Assembly resolution repeats the same language contained in Security Council
Resolution 777.
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the continuity of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 167
Yet, the United Kingdom's statement served only to muddle the issue fur-
ther. By stating that the resolution was not designed as a "punitive mea-
sure" but was necessary because of the FRY's "completely unjustified
claim" to be the continuity of the former Yugoslavia, it seemed to support
the U.S. view as opposed to Russia's characterization of the measure as a
"suspension." On the other hand, by stating that the FRY representatives
"may not sit in the seat of Yugoslavia in any organ of the Assembly," it gave
support to the position that the action was not intended to limit the FRY's
continuing participation in other U.N. bodies.
Understandably, some members of the U.N. Secretariat were initially
confused about the meaning of this resolution. The morning after Resolu-
tion 47/1 was adopted, the flag of Yugoslavia was not raised with those of
the other members of the United Nations.' 68 When asked at a press brief-
ing if that meant Yugoslavia's membership in the organization had
expired as the United States had asserted, the spokesman for the Presi-
dent of the General Assembly responded that "a misunderstanding of a
technical nature had occurred and that the flag would be hoisted within
the next 30 minutes."1 69 He added "that there were still 179 Member
States of the United Nations."'7 0 In an attempt to settle the matter, Croa-
tia and Bosnia transmitted a letter to the Secretary-General requesting a
legal opinion as to the FRYs status in the United Nations. 17' The FRY, in
turn, sent a letter to the Secretary-General arguing for a narrow interpreta-
tion of Security Council Resolution 777 and General Assembly Resolution
47/1.172
On September 29, then Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs of
the United Nations, Carl-August Fleishchhauer, circulated a legal opinion
on the meaning of the resolutions, which stated as follows:
The following sets forth the understanding of the United Nations Sec-
retariat regarding the practical consequences of the resolution.
1. While the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automatically con-
167. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 141-44, U.N. Doc. A/47/PV.7 (1992).
168. DPI Daily Press Briefing, Sept. 23, 1992 (statement of Alexander Taukatch,
spokesman for the President of the General Assembly) (on file with the Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. If a country has to apply for membership in the United Nations-as stated
in paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 47/1-it is our understanding
that the country in question is not a member until and when the application
has been accepted by the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the
Security Council.
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/47/474 (1992).
172. "Resolution 47/1 stipulates Yugoslavia's non-participation in the work of the
General Assembly. This decision does not affect its membership in the United Nations
and therefore the question of the flag and the name-plate of Yugoslavia in the General
Assembly should not be brought up." U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 8,
para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/478, S/24599 (1992).
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tinue the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via in the United Nations and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United
Nations, the only practical consequence that the resolution draws is that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not partici-
pate in the work of the General Assembly.
2. Representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can no longer
participate in the work of the General Assembly, its subsidiary organs, nor
conferences and meetings convened by it.
3. The resolution neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia's membership
in the Organization. Consequently,
a) The seat and nameplate remain as before, but in Assembly bodies
representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) cannot sit behind the sign "Yugoslavia." In addition, Yugoslav missions
at United Nations Headquarters and offices may continue to function and
may receive and circulate documents. At Headquarters, the Secretariat con-
tinues to fly the flag of the old Yugoslavia as it is the last flag of Yugoslavia
used by the Secretariat.
b) The resolution does not take away the right of Yugoslavia to par-
ticipate in the work of organs other than Assembly bodies.
c) The admission to the United Nations of a new Yugoslavia under
Article 4 of the Charter will terminate this situation.
4. Resolution 47/1 applies directly only to the United Nations and is not
legally binding on the specialized and related agencies.'
75
The members of the United Nations were generally taken aback by
the spin the U.N. Legal Counsel had given the resolutions. By a vote of
109 in favor and 57 opposed, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
"urg[ing] Member States and the Secretariat in fulfilling the spirit of reso-
lution 47/1, to end the de facto working status of Serbia and Montene-
gro."'1 7 4 Under pressure from the Islamic countries in particular, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 821, which "recommend[ed] to the
General Assembly that, further to the decisions taken in resolution 47/1, it
decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
shall not participate in the work of the Economic and Social Council," 175
the other major organ of the United Nations.176 At the same time, efforts
were launched to exclude the FRY from participating in U.N. specialized
178. Letter from Carl-August Fleischhauer, Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs, to Kenneth Dadzie, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Sept. 29, 1992) [hereinafter Fleischhauer Letter]
(on file with the Cornel International Law Journal). Identical letters were sent to all
United Nations Organs and the specialized and related agencies.
174. GA. Res. 48/88, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 42, para. 19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/88 (1993).
175. S.C. Res. 821, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3204th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/821
(1993). The General Assembly implemented the Security Council's recommendation
through GA. Res. 47/229, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
47/229 (1993).
176. The FRY does not have a seat on the Security Council or the Trusteeship Coun-
cil, and there is no FRYJudge on the International Court ofJustice. Thus, this action
effectively excluded the FRY from participating as a member in all of the United
Nations organs and their subsidiary bodies.
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and related agencies. While the U.N. Legal Counsel's opinion had said
that the resolutions were not legally binding on the specialized and
related agencies, this was not viewed as precluding action on their part to
exclude the FRY through their own resolutions. 177 During the next few
months, the International Civil Aviation Organization,' 7 8 the Interna-
tional Fund for Agricultural Development, 179 the International Maritime
Organization,'8 " the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion,' 8 ' the World Health Organization, 182 and several other organiza-
177. Technically, with respect to membership issues, the main organs of the United
Nations and the specialized agencies are autonomous and thus the General Assembly
could not impose its will upon them. Nevertheless, in 1950, in response to the dispute
over whether the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China should represent
China in the United Nations, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 396 (V), which
provided that the position of the General Assembly on membership questions should
be taken into account in other bodies of the U.N. system. The purpose of this resolu-
tion was to ensure that "a Member State [w]ould not be represented in a different
manner in various organs of the United Nations." 1 REPERTORY OF PRACrIcE OF UNITED
NATIONS ORGANs 286 (1955). This precedent suggests that, with respect to the question
of the FRY's membership, the specialized agencies should be guided by the position
taken by the General Assembly.
178. Second Report oftheICAO Credentials Committee, U.N. ICAO, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A29-WP/125 (Sept. 24, 1992). By a vote of 101 in favor to 3 opposed, with 35 absten-
tions, the Assembly decided "that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) should apply for membership in ICAO pursuant to chapter 21 of the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation and that it shall not participate in the work
of ICAO." (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
179. "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for
membership in IFAD, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Establishing
IFAD; and that, in the meantime, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) shall not participate in the work of the governing bodies of IFAD." Member
Status of Yugoslavia, U.N. IFAD, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. GC 16/INF.4 (Dec. 17, 1992) (on
file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
180. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic ofYugo-
slavia in IMO; and decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of IMO until its membership in
the Organization has been accomplished.
Report of the Status of the Convention and Membership of the Organization, U.N. IMO, 70th
Sess., Agenda Item 3, Annex, U.N. Doc. C 70/3/1 (Mar. 17, 1993) (on file with the
Cornell International Law Journal).
181. [D]ecides that the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in UNIDO pursuant to article 3 of the Constitu-
tion of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and that it
shall not participate in the work of the Programme and Budget Committee, the
Industrial Development Board and the General Conference of UNIDO.
Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the Principal and
Subsidiay Organs of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, U.N. UNIDO,
2d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. GC/S.1/Res.1 (Mar. 30, 1993).
182. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for
membership in WHO pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization and that it shall not participate in the work of
the principal and subsidiary organs of WHO, including the Forty-sixth World
Health Assembly.
Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the Principal and
Subsidiay Organs of WHO, U.N. WHO, 46th Sess., 1st plen. mtg., Supp. Agenda Item 1,
U.N. Doc. WHA46.1 (May 3, 1993).
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ions adopted resolutions modeled after General Assembly Resolution 47/
1.
D. Making Sense of the FRY Precedent
Commentators have argued over the meaning of Security Council Resolu-
tion 777 and General Assembly Resolution 47/1,183 and even the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice has stated that the solution adopted through those
resolutions "is not free from legal difficulty."' 8 4 Clearly, the resolutions
did not achieve the specific result the United States had sought, namely
the complete exclusion of the FRY from the United Nations until such
time as it is formally admitted on the legal ground that it was not the
continuation of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the U.N. action
cannot be viewed as merely a disguised suspension as the Russian delega-
tion characterized it. First, the primary sponsor of Resolution 47/1 explic-
itly stated when introducing the resolution that this was not a punitive
measure but was the legally compelled result of the FRY's unjustified claim
to be the continuation of the former Yugoslavia. Second, the relevant res-
olutions all make clear that the only way the FRY can participate again in
the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and various special-
ized agencies is to apply and be admitted as a new member. The resolu-
tions, in effect, placed the FRY's membership in a sort of twilight zone
pending its admission into the organization as a new member. This
interim arrangement allowed the FRY to operate a U.N. mission and circu-
late documents but excluded the FRY from participating as a member in
the vast majority of bodies within the U.N. system.
The solution crafted by the Security Council was obviously motivated
by political factors, most importantly (1) the desire to preserve the Coun-
cil's control over this type of membership question rather than allow the
General Assembly to act unilaterally on the issue, and (2) the desire to
maintain continuing contacts with FRY authorities at the United Nations
to facilitate a peace settlement. In reaching this decision, however, the
United Nations did not simply disregard the U.N. Charter and U.N. prece-
dent. Rather, the decision was guided by the principles adopted by the
Sixth Committee in 1947, which suggested that a State would cease to be a
member of the United Nations if "the extinction of the State as a legal
personality" could be shown. 18 5 Nor were the India and Russia precedents
overlooked in deciding to exclude the FRY from participation. Rather,
the distinctions between the FRY situation and those precedents formed
183. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 137; Degan, supra note 156; Ove E. Bring, Correspon-
dents'Agora" UN Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM.J. INT'L L 244 (1993); M.
Kelly Malone, Correspondents' Agora: UN Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 246 (1993);Yehuda Z. Blum, Correspondents'Agora: UNMembership of the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 248 (1993).
184. Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Monte-
negro)), 1993 I.CJ. 14 (Apr. 8).
185. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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the basis of the decision. Thus, the U.N. Legal Counsel's opinion stresses
that Resolution 47/1
deals with a membership issue which is not foreseen in the Charter of the
United Nations, namely, the consequences for purposes of membership in
the United Nations of the disintegration of a Member State on which there
is no agreement among the immediate successors of that State or among
the membership of the Organization at large.' 8 6
E. Rebirth of the Forgotten Alternative
For nearly fifty years, the United Nations has approached succession to
membership as a question of continuity. Since deciding in 1947 that both
India and Pakistan could not succeed to the British India seat, it has never
looked back. One U.N. specialized agency, however, has recently
departed from the continuity theory and the India/Pakistan precedent.
While the United Nations was wrestling with the question of whether the
FRY could be deemed the continuity of Yugoslavia, the International Mon-
etary Fund (JIMF) decided to allow Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia,
and the FRY all to succeed to the membership of the former Yugoslavia.18 7
Under this approach, "the successor will be considered to have been a
member without interruption since the dissolution of the SFRY and to
have continued, for its share, the membership of the SFRY in the IMF." 88
The IMF's solution to the problem stands in stark contrast to the con-
ventional view that, because of the personal nature of membership in an
organization, the only way membership can be retained after the breakup
of a member-State is through a finding of continuity.' 8 9 The IMF plainly
selected the one alternative that the United Nations decided to forego in
determining succession to membership. The United Nations would soon
be presented with a case-the breakup of Czechoslovakia-in which the
IMF's approach would better serve its political interests than strict adher-
186. Fleischhauer Letter, supra note 173, at 1.
187. International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 92/92, at I (Dec. 15, 1992) (on
file with the Cornell International Law Journal). The IMF required only that each repub-
lic agree to the division of the former Yugoslavia's assets and liabilities arrived at by the
IMF, namely- Bosnia-13.20%; Croatia-28.49%; Macedonia-5.40%; Slovenia-
16.39%; and FRY-36.52%. Id.
188. Id. at 2. The IMF established the following conditions as a prerequisite to suc-
cession: (1) notification to the IMF that the State agrees to the allocation of its share in
the assets and liabilities of Yugoslavia; (2) notification to the IMF that the State agrees
to succeed to the membership in accordance with the terms and conditions specified by
the IMF and has taken all necessary steps to enable it to succeed to such membership
and carry out all of its obligations under the IMF Articles of Agreement; (3) a determi-
nation has been made by the IMF that the State is able to meet its obligations under the
Articles; and (4) the State has no overdue financial obligations to the IMF. See Paul R.
Williams, State Succession and the lnternational Financial Institutions: Political Criteria v. Pro-
tection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 43 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 776, 803 (1994). Pur-
suant to these conditions, the IMF allowed Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Macedonia to succeed to membership but denied Serbia-Montenegro's request for suc-
cession on the basis that it would not be able to meet the third condition while under
U.N.-imposed economic sanctions. Id.
189. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ence to the continuity theory. The U.N. response to the Czechoslovakia
case would therefore test the value placed on precedent in deciding mem-
bership issues.
IV. The Czechoslovakia Split
A. The Velvet Divorce
On January 1, 1993, in what has become known as the "velvet divorce," the
country of Czechoslovakia divided into the newly independent Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic.' 90 Following the India and Russia prece-
dents, the Czech Republic-which made up a substantial majority of the
territory, population, and resources of the former Czechoslovakia-had a
strong case for continuing Czechoslovakia's U.N. membership.' 9 ' Two
weeks before the division, however, Czechoslovakia's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs informed the United Nations that "the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic [CSFR] as well as the CSFR membership of the United Nations
will cease to exist on December 31, 1992. Both successor States-the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic-are determined to apply for the
U.N. membership in the very first days of 1993."192
Like India and Russia, the Czech and Slovak republics had entered
into a devolution agreement. 19 Their agreement, however, did not pro-
vide for Czechoslovakia's membership in the United Nations and related
bodies to devolve on one of the two new States. Rather, it purported to
divide up Czechoslovakia's membership between the two.19 4
190. See Mathernovi, supra note 6.
191. Mary Battiata, Czechs, Slovaks Set 'Velvet Divorce, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at
A25. The former Czechoslovakia had a territory of 49,365 square miles, a population of
16 million, and a gross domestic product of $120 billion. After the split, the Czech
Republic's territory was 30,500 square miles, its population was 10.5 million, and its
gross domestic product was $75.3 billion; the Slovak Republic's territory was only 19,000
square miles, its population was 5.5 million, and its gross domestic product was $32.1
billion. See THE WoRLn ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 1993, at 747 (1992); THE WoRiL
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FAcrs 1995, at 760, 818 (1994).
192. Department of State Cable No. Prague 10971 (Dec. 17, 1992) (captioned "Text
of Czechoslovak Diplomatic Note on UN Membership for Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics") (on file with the Cornell International LawJournao.
198. See Membership Agreement, supra note 7.
194. The Czech Republic would have inherited Czechoslovakia's membership in the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the U.N. Committee on
Decolonization, the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations, the U.N.
Statistical Commission, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the UNICEF Execu-
tive Board, and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, among others. Id. at 2.
The Slovak Republic would have assumed the Czechoslovakia seat in the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Development Pro-
gram, the United Nations Environmental Program, the United Nations Committee on
the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, the U.N. Committee on Information, the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women, and the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, among others. Id.
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B. The United Nations Response
The U.N. Legal Counsel circulated an opinion stating that "Czechoslova-
kia has ceased to exist as of 1 January 1993; there was no continuity by an
entity under the same or different name. The membership of the United
Nations was reduced to 178 as of that date."' 9 5 As a consequence, the
United Nations took the position that the seats that had been occupied by
the former Czechoslovakia in U.N. subsidiary organs became vacant as of
January 1, 1993.196
On January 19, 1993, the General Assembly, acting on the recommen-
dation of the Security Council, 197 approved the admission of the Slovak
Republic and the Czech Republic as new members of the United
Nations.' 98 The United Nations did not, however, allow the Czech Repub-
lic and Slovak Republic automatically to fill the vacancies created by the
extinction of Czechoslovakia's membership. Instead, it required that the
vacancies be filled through the method appropriate to each body, namely
by appointment of the President of the General Assembly, by nomination
of the President of the General Assembly and agreement of the members
of the General Assembly, or by formal elections.19 9 Similarly, the U.N.
Specialized Agencies took the position "that neither one nor both of the
newly formed republics can automatically continue the membership of
Czechoslovakia in the agency concerned. Consequently the new republics
will be admitted as new members according to the procedures established
in the constitution of the respective agencies." 20 0
The Czechoslovakia case confirmed a number of points concerning
succession to membership in the United Nations. First, only one State can
be the continuation of a former member. The Czech and Slovak repub-
lics' effort to divide the former Czechoslovakia's seat in U.N. subsidiary
195. Memorandum from the President of the Council of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization to the Representatives of the Council, ICAO Doc. Pres AK/339, E 1/
1.16, at 2 (Jan. 28, 1993) (summarizing U.N. Legal Counsel's opinion) (on file with the
Cornell International Law Journal).
196. U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/861 (1993). The
IMF, in contrast, consistent with its decision concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
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bodies and specialized agencies was viewed as incompatible with this prin-
ciple. Second, the case indicates that, notwithstanding the strength of the
factors counseling for a finding of continuity, a would-be successor
foregoes the continuity option if it applies for and is admitted into the
United Nations as a new member. In other words, a State cannot simulta-
neously be a new member and a continuing member of the United
Nations.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the State system has become increas-
ingly fluid, with the centrifugal forces of nationalism perpetually eroding
the glue that binds federal States. Across the globe, the recent spate of
secessions and dissolutions shows no sign of abating. For example, Can-
ada may soon lose the province of Quebec to secession, North and South
Yemen may soon (again) split into two countries, Iraq, Somalia, and Ethio-
pia totter toward disintegration, and a recent U.S. Defense Department
report concluded that "China fares a 50-50 chance of breaking up Soviet-
style after the death of leader Deng Xiaoping."20 1 As Professor Oscar
Schachter recently observed, "these events are not only the stuff of history;
they foreshadow the future."20 2
Before 1991, U.N. decisions on membership succession were largely
governed by a single precedent, the India/Pakistan split, and the general
principles propounded by the U.N. Legal Committee in 1947 in response
to that case. With the recent breakup of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia, there now exists a sufficient range of precedent to map
with some precision the contours of U.N. law of succession to
membership.
Under the generally accepted legal theory of succession to member-
ship in international organizations, succession is possible only if the suc-
cessor can establish sufficient legal identity with the former member. The
India, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia cases suggest that in deter-
mining whether a potential successor is the continuation of the member
or whether the member's international personality has been extinguished,
the relevant factors include whether the potential successor has: (a) a sub-
stantial majority of the former member's territory (including the historic
territorial hub), (b) a majority of its population, (c) a majority of its
resources, (d) a majority of its armed forces, (e) the seat of the govern-
ment and control of most central government institutions, and (f) entered
into a devolution agreement on U.N. membership with the other compo-
nents of the former State.
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There were two main reasons why India and Russia were treated as
continuation cases and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were treated as dis-
solutions. First, the United Nations placed great emphasis on the exist-
ence of devolution agreements which provided that Russia would be
entitled to the Soviet Union's membership in international organizations
and that India would be entitled to British India's membership in interna-
tional organizations. No such agreement existed between the components
of the former Yugoslavia, and the agreement between the Czech and
Slovak Republics purported to divide up seats within U.N. subsidiary bod-
ies and specialized agencies-something which is not compatible with the
all-or-nothing nature of continuity. Second, both Russia and India consti-
tuted a substantial majority of the former State's territory and had a major-
ity of its population and resources. The FRY, in contrast, occupied only
forty percent of the former Yugoslavia's territory and possessed only forty-
five percent of the former Yugoslavia's population and significantly less of
its resources. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, could have made a
compelling case for continuity based on its size, population, and
resources, but it forfeited the option when it applied for U.N. membership
as a new State.
Given the political nature of the United Nations, it would have come
as no real surprise if it handled the question of succession to membership
in a completely ad hoc basis without any passing reference to precedent or
legal doctrine. While one might still be able to explain the disposition of
the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia seats as a function of politics,
the results were in fact enunciated in the context of previously established
principles and precedent. There are a variety of reasons why this should
be so. First, the development of, and adherence to, generally applicable
rules of succession to membership has the practical benefit of predictabil-
ity and fairness in future cases. Second, the appeal to the authority of law
in deciding membership questions reflects an acknowledgment that the
U.N. Charter is ultimately a multinational treaty whose interpretation and
application should be based on legal principles. Third, in light of the bit-
ing criticism the United Nations endured during the twelve years it
refused without legal justification to allow the government of the People's
Republic of China to represent China in the Security Council and General
Assembly, U.N. members are now especially sensitive to the public percep-
tion of the United Nations as an organization whose membership ques-
tions are governed by the rule of law.20 3 Even today's most powerful
countries desire to avoid what may appear to be acts of arbitrary discretion
in deciding such questions, especially in the very public forum of the U.N.
General Assembly. This is not to suggest that the rules governing succes-
sion to membership have not been, or cannot be, manipulated for polit-
ical reasons; what is significant is that the members of the United Nations
have found it in their interests to act (or at least to depict their actions)
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concerning membership succession in conformity with legal principles
and precedent.
On the other hand, it makes little sense for the United Nations to
continue to follow a rule simply because it was promulgated in the early
years of its existence. It makes still less sense "if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past."20 4 While the continuity approach may have
made sense during the Cold War, in an era in which U.N membership is
said to be "universal,"20 5 there is no compelling reason why all of the suc-
cessor States should not be permitted to inherit the predecessor State's
membership in the same way new States succeed to multilateral treaties.
206
To the extent a successor State, such as the FRY, persists in violating the
principles contained in the U.N. Charter, rather than reject its claim to
membership based on a theory of discontinuity, the better approach
might be to expel or suspend the member under articles 5 and 6 of the
Charter. Now that the International Monetary Fund has departed from
the continuity approach in dealing with succession to Yugoslavia's and
Czechoslovakia's membership, 20 7 the time seems ripe for the United
Nations to revisit the continuing logic of the India/Pakistan precedent in
a manner that does not disrupt its commitment to the rule of law, perhaps
by requesting the International Law Commission 20 8 to undertake a thor-
ough study of the question of succession to membership in the United
Nations.
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